Facing Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City is like getting a Christmas present from an auntie you haven’t seen in years: you never know what’s coming until you open it.

The team sheet might give you a hint, but the static shape of it on that piece of A4 is probably miles away from what you are going to face out on the field. In possession and out of possession. Guardiola’s search for different solutions at times backfires, but for most of a season, it gives him an unpredictable edge.

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In City’s previous encounter with Liverpool (a 1-0 Premier League home win at Anfield in October), their 3-2-4-1 shape on the ball didn’t bring them much success. Part of that was because of Alisson’s important saves, and the other part was due to Liverpool’s best performance off the ball this season. In that game, their 4-4-2 shape without the ball made it harder for City to access their No 10s.

Yet the question against City will always be: are they going to change the approach, or use the same one?

“We all know with City, as always: different ideas for different games and you always have to get used to it during the game,” Liverpool manager Jurgen Klopp said after Thursday’s 3-2 loss away to City in the last 16 of the Carabao Cup. “You never know exactly what will happen.”

Last night, Liverpool were back to their standard 4-3-3 shape without the ball, but City continued with the 3-2-4-1 shape on the ball that Guardiola had tried two months ago. This time, it worked.

From the start of the game, Rico Lewis moved inside next to Rodri as Kevin De Bruyne and Ilkay Gundogan positioned themselves behind Liverpool’s midfield to make it a four-versus-three in the centre of the pitch.

The way De Bruyne and Gundogan (highlighted in yellow below) roamed on the blind side of Liverpool’s midfielders caused problems for Klopp’s side…

…especially with the wide positioning of Riyad Mahrez and Cole Palmer pinning back the full-backs, and allowing De Bruyne and Gundogan to receive freely.

If James Milner or Andrew Robertson decided to move up towards Gundogan or De Bruyne, City simply played a direct ball in to Palmer or Mahrez.

In the above example, Aymeric Laporte’s long pass finds Palmer, who sets up De Bruyne for a shot that he fails to connect with cleanly.

In another attack where Liverpool’s midfield three are focused on closing down the City midfield, Gundogan’s positioning attracts Milner, leaving Palmer (yellow) free on the left. On the other side of the pitch, De Bruyne roams to the touchline and Robertson leaves Mahrez to Joe Gomez.

The knock-on effect when Mahrez drops, dragging Gomez with him, is that Erling Haaland attacks that space to meet Manuel Akanji’s pass behind the defence, with Gundogan and Palmer (highlighted yellow below) overloading Milner on the far side.

This allows Haaland to find Palmer, but he misses the target completely from just seven yards out.

Throughout the first half, Liverpool’s midfield (on the red dots) had their eyes on Rodri and Lewis, but with the excellent positioning of De Bruyne and Gundogan (yellow), their full-backs were constantly overloaded.

Here, after a switch of play from Laporte to Mahrez, Gundogan’s run pins Milner…

…and frees Palmer to receive Mahrez’s pass. Because of Gundogan, Palmer has time on the ball and manages to put in a cross that is flicked by Mahrez then narrowly misses Haaland.

In another example, De Bruyne starts an attack when positioned behind Thiago…

…so when City circulate the ball to the near side through Akanji, Robertson is forced to move forward to close down De Bruyne, but the Belgian knows the drill and signals for Akanji to play a pass to Mahrez…

…which drags Gomez out of position and frees space in the Liverpool defence for De Bruyne (yellow) to attack.

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While this is happening, Milner is once again in a two-versus-one scenario on the other side.

De Bruyne’s run forces Joel Matip to leave Haaland for Milner to pick up, and that produces two free passing options for De Bruyne in Gundogan and Palmer.

He chooses the Germany international, but his shot is saved by Caoimhin Kelleher.

This approach from City allowed them to control the game and was key to their second goal.

In the build-up to it, Gundogan and De Bruyne (yellow) are in their designated positions in midfield. Mohamed Salah’s attempt to block the passing lane to Gundogan opens up the wide pass towards Nathan Ake…

…who then finds Gundogan, with Fabinho not close enough and Gomez having to move up to face Ake.

This means Liverpool’s defence shifts across to cover, leaving Mahrez (yellow) in acres of space because Robertson has to move inside to mark the advanced De Bruyne.

The Belgium international instructs Palmer to play the switch to Mahrez (yellow) as he knows the Algerian is free, but Palmer takes the safer option in Gundogan. An inaccurate pass falls to Thiago instead…

…who fails to control the ball and it eventually reaches its originally intended target by chance. Gundogan instantly plays it back to Rodri…

…and the Spain midfielder finds a free Mahrez, who controls brilliantly and scores to put City back in front.

“The positioning of De Bruyne and Gundogan, in combination with Palmer and Mahrez, gave us some problems,” Klopp explained. The Liverpool manager understood the issue, but going into the game it’s hard to predict City’s approach — even if it’s similar to the one they just used against you a few weeks ago.

“Against City, you should have a perfectly-oiled machine available,” he added, “because they always do little things differently which have a big impact and you have to adapt to that quickly.”